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This  essay  reflects  upon  the  relationship  between  the  current  theory  of
financial intermediation and real-world practice. Our critical analysis of this
theory  leads  to  several  building  blocks  of  a new  theory  of  financial
intermediation.
Current  financial  intermediation  theory  builds  on  the  notion  that
intermediaries  serve  to  reduce  transaction  costs  and  informational
asymmetries.  As  developments  in  information  technology,  deregulation,
deepening  of  financial  markets,  etc.  tend  to  reduce  transaction  costs  and
informational asymmetries, financial intermediation theory shall come to the
conclusion  that  intermediation  becomes  useless.  This  contrasts  with  the
practitioner’s view of financial intermediation as a value-creating economic
process.  It  also  conflicts  with  the  continuing  and  increasing  economic
importance of financial intermediaries. From this paradox, we conclude that
current  financial  intermediation  theory  fails  to  provide  a satisfactory
understanding of the existence of financial intermediaries.
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and only we are responsible for mistakes and omissions.
* Associate Professor of Financial Economics at the University of Groningen; PO Box 800;
9700 AVGroningen; The Netherlands (corresponding author).
† Professor of Financial Institutions at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam; PO Box 1738;
3000  DR  Rotterdam;  The  Netherlands,  (former  Chairman  of  the  Managing  Board  of
MeesPierson).We present building blocks for a theory of financial intermediation that aims
at understanding and explaining the existence and the behavior of real-life
financial intermediaries. When information asymmetries are not the driving
force  behind  intermediation  activity  and  their  elimination  is  not  the
commercial motive for financial intermediaries, the question arises which
paradigm,  as  an  alternative,  could  better  express  the  essence  of  the
intermediation process. In our opinion, the concept of value creation in the
context of the value chain might serve that purpose. And, in our opinion, it is
risk and risk management that drives this value creation. The absorption of
risk is the central function of both banking and insurance. The risk function
bridges  a mismatch  between  the  supply  of  savings  and  the  demand  for
investments as savers are on average more risk averse than real investors.
Risk, that means maturity risk, counterparty risk, market risk (interest rate and
stock  prices),  life  expectancy,  income  expectancy  risk  etc.,  is  the  core
business of the financial industry. Financial intermediaries can absorb risk on
the scale required by the market because their scale permits a sufficiently
diversified portfolio of investments needed to offer the security required by
savers and policyholders. Financial intermediaries are not just agents who
screen  and  monitor  on  behalf  of  savers.  They  are  active  counterparts
themselves offering a specific product that cannot be offered by individual
investors to savers, namely cover for risk. They use their reputation and their
balance sheet and off-balance sheet items, rather than their very limited own
funds, to act as such counterparts. As such, they have a crucial function within
the modern economy.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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When a banker starts to study the theory of financial intermediation in order
to better understand what he has done during his professional life, he enters
a world unknown to him. That world is full of concepts which he did not, or
hardly,  knew  before  and  full  of  expressions  he  never  used  himself:
asymmetric  information,  adverse  selection,  monitoring,  costly  state
verification, moral hazard and a couple more of the same kind. He gets the
uneasy feeling that a growing divergence has emerged between the micro-
economic theory of banking, as it took shape in the last three decades, and the
everyday behavior of bankers according to their business motives, expressed
in the language they use.
This essay tries to reflect on the merits of the present theory of financial
intermediation, on what it does and does not explain from both a practical and
a theoretical point of view. The theory is impressive by the multitude of
applications in the financial world of the agency theory and the theory of
asymmetric information, of adverse selection and moral hazard. As well as by
their relevance for important aspects of the financial intermediation process,
as is shown in an ever-growing stream of economic studies. But the study of
all these theories leaves the practitioner with the impression that they do not
provide a satisfactory answer to the basic question; which forces really drive
the financial intermediation process? The current theory shows and explains
a great variety in the behavior of financial intermediaries in the market in their
relation to savers and to investors/entrepreneurs. But as far as the authors of
this essay are aware, it does not, or not yet, provide a satisfactory answer to
the question of why real-life financial institutions exist, what keeps them alive
and what is their essential contribution to (inter)national economic welfare.
We believe that this question cannot be addressed by a further extension of
the present theory, by the framework of the agency theory and the theory of
asymmetric  information.  The  question  goes  into  the  heart  of  the  present
theory, into the paradigm on which it is based. This paradigm is the famous
classical idea of the perfect market, introduced by Marshall and Walras. Since
then, it has been the leading principle, the central point of reference in the
theory of competition, the neoclassical growth theory, the portfolio theory and
also the leading principle of the present theory of financial intermediation.
Financial  intermediaries,  according  to  that  theory,  have  a function  only
because financial markets are not perfect. They exist by the grace of market
7imperfections.  As  long  as  there  are  market  imperfections,  there  are
intermediaries. As soon as markets are perfect, intermediaries are redundant;
they have lost their function because savers and investors dispose of the
perfect  information  needed  to  find  each  other  directly,  immediately  and
without any impediments, so without costs, and to deal at optimal prices. This
is the general equilibrium model à la Arrow-Debreu in which banks cannot
exist. Obviously, this contrasts with the huge economic and social importance
of financial intermediaries in highly developed modern economies. Empirical
observations  point  at  an  increasing  role  for  financial  intermediaries  in
economies  that  experience  vastly  decreasing  information  and  transaction
costs. Our essay goes into this paradox and comes up with an amendment of
the existing theory of financial intermediation.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we introduce the foundations
of the modern literature of financial intermediation theory. From this, we infer
the  key  predictions  with  respect  to  the  role  of  the  financial  intermediary
within the economy. In Section 3, we will investigate the de facto role of
financial  intermediaries  in  modern  economies.  We  discuss  views  on  the
theoretical relevance of financial intermediaries for economic growth. We
also present some stylized facts and empirical observations about their current
position in the economy. The mainstream theory of financial intermediation is
briefly presented in Section 4. Of course, we cannot pay sufficient attention
to all developments in this area but will focus on the basic rationales for
financial intermediaries according to this theory, i.e. information problems,
transaction costs, and regulation. Section 5 is a critical assessment of this
theory  of  financial  intermediation.  An  alternative  approach  of  financial
intermediation is unfolded in Section 6. In Section 7, we present the main
building blocks for an alternative theory of financial intermediation that aims
at  understanding  and  explaining  the  behavior  of  real-life  financial
intermediaries. Here, we argue that risk management is the core issue in
understanding  this  behavior.  Transforming  risk  for  ultimate  savers  and
lenders  and  risk  management  by  the  financial  intermediary  itself  creates
economic value, both for the intermediary and for its client. Accordingly, it is
the  transformation  and  management  of  risk  that  is  the  intermediaries’
contribution to the economic welfare of the society it operates in. This is – in
our  opinion  –  the  hidden  or  neglected  economic  rationale  behind  the
emergence  and  the  existence  and  the  future  of  real-life  financial
intermediaries.  In  Section  8,  we  conclude  our  essay  with  a proposal  for
a research agenda for an amended theory of financial intermediation.
8 Introduction2.  The Perfect Model
Three pillars are at the basis of the modern theory of finance: optimality,
arbitrage,  and  equilibrium.  Optimality  refers  to  the  notion  that  rational
investors aim at optimal returns. Arbitrage implies that the same asset has the
same price in each single period in the absence of restrictions. Equilibrium
means that markets are cleared by price adjustment – through arbitrage – at
each moment in time. In the neoclassical model of a perfect market, e.g. the
perfect market for capital, or the Arrow-Debreu world, the following criteria
usually must be met:
– no individual party on the market can influence prices;
– conditions  for  borrowing/lending  are  equal  for  all  parties  under  equal
circumstances;
– there are no discriminatory taxes;
– absence of scale and scope economies;
– all financial titles are homogeneous, divisible and tradable;
– there are no information costs, no transaction costs and no insolvency
costs;
– all market parties have ex ante and ex post immediate and full information
on  all  factors  and  events  relevant  for  the  (future)  value  of  the  traded
financial instruments.
The Arrow-Debreu world is based on the paradigm of complete markets. In
the case of complete markets, present value prices of investment projects are
well defined. Savers and investors find each other because they have perfect
information  on  each  others  preferences  at  no  cost  in  order  to  exchange
savings against readily available financial instruments. These instruments are
constructed and traded costlessly and they fully and simultaneously meet the
needs of both savers and investors. Thus, each possible future state of the
world is fully covered by a so-called Arrow-Debreu security (state contingent
claim). Also important is that the supply of capital instruments is sufficiently
diversified as to provide the possibility of full risk diversification and, thanks
to complete information, market parties have homogenous expectations and
act rationally. In so far as this does not occur naturally, intermediaries are
useful to bring savers and investors together and to create instruments that
meet their needs. They do so with reimbursement of costs, but costs are by
definition an element – or, rather, characteristic – of market imperfection.
Therefore, intermediaries are at best tolerated and would be eliminated in
a move  towards  market  perfection,  with  all  intermediaries  becoming
9redundant: the perfect state of disintermediation. This model is the starting
point in the present theory of financial intermediation. All deviations from
this model which exist in the real world and which cause intermediation by
the specialized financial intermediaries, are seen as market imperfections.
This  wording  suggests  that  intermediation  is  something  which  exploits
a situation which is not perfect, therefore is undesirable and should or will be
temporary. The perfect market is like heaven, it is a teleological perspective,
an ideal standard according to which reality is judged. As soon as we are in
heaven, intermediaries are superfluous. There is no room for them in that
magnificent place.
Are  we  going  to  heaven?  Are  intermediaries  increasingly  becoming
superfluous?  One  would  be  inclined  to  answer  both  questions  in  the
affirmative when looking to what is actually happening: Increasingly, we
have  to  make  do  with  liberalized,  deregulated  financial  markets.  All
information  on  important  macroeconomic  and  monetary  data  and  on  the
quality and activities of market participants is available in ‘real time’, on
a global  scale,  twenty-four  hours  a day,  thanks  to  the  breathtaking
developments  in  information  and  communication  technology.  Firms  issue
shares over the Internet and investors can put their order directly in financial
markets  thanks  to  the  virtual  reality.  The  communication  revolution  also
reduces information costs tremendously. The liberalization and deregulation
give,  moreover,  a strong  stimulus  towards  the  securitization  of  financial
instruments,  making  them  transparent,  homogeneous,  and  tradable  in  the
international financial centers in the world. Only taxes are discriminating,
inside and between countries. Transaction costs are still there, but they are
declining in relative importance thanks to the cost efficiency of ICT and
efficiencies  of  scale.  Insolvency  and  liquidity  risks,  however,  still  are  an
important source of heterogeneity of financial titles. Furthermore, every new
crash or crisis invokes calls for additional and more timely information. For
example,  the  Asia  crisis  resulted  in  more  advanced  and  verifiable  and
controllable international financial statistics, whereas the Enron debacle has
put the existing business accounting and reporting standards into question.
There  appears  to  be  an  almost  unstoppable  demand  for  additional
information.
10 The Perfect Model3. Financial Intermediaries in the Economy
So, we are making important progress in our march towards heaven and what
happens? Is financial intermediation fading away? One might think so from
the  forces  shaping  the  current  financial  environment:  deregulation  and
liberalization,  communication,  internationalization.  But  what  is  actually
happening in the real world? Do we really witness the demise of the financial
institutions? Are the intermediaries about to vanish from planet Earth? On the
contrary, their economic importance is higher than ever and appears to be
increasing. This is the case even during the 1990s when markets became
almost fully liberalized and when communication on a global scale made
a real and almost complete breakthrough. The tendency towards an increasing
role of financial intermediation is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 that give the
relative contribution of the financial sector to the two key items of economic
wealth and welfare in most nations, i.e. GDP and labor. These tables show
that, even in highly developed markets, financial intermediaries tend to play
a substantial  and  increasing  role  in  the  current  economy.  Furthermore,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) among others, conclude that claims of
deposit money banks and of other financial institutions on the private sector
have steadily increased as a percentage of GDPin a large number of countries
(circa 150), rich and poor, between the 1960s and 1990s. The pace of increase
is not declining in the 1990s. This is reflected in Table 3.
In the 1960s, Raymond Goldsmith (1969) gave stylized facts on financial
structure and economic development (see appendix A). He found that in the
course of economic development, a country’s financial system grows more
rapidly  than  national  wealth.  It  appears  that  the  main  determinant  of  the
relative size of a country’s financial system is the separation of the functions
of saving and investing among different (groups of) economic units. This
observation sounds remarkably modern. Since the early 1990s, there has been
growing recognition for the positive impact of financial intermediation on the
economy. Both theoretical and empirical studies find that a well-developed
financial  system  is  beneficial  to  the  economy  as  a whole.  Basically  the
argument behind this idea is that the efficient allocation of capital within an
economy  fosters  economic  growth  (see  Levine,  1997).  Financial
intermediation can affect economic growth by acting on the saving rate, on
the  fraction  of  saving  channeled  to  investment  or  on  the  social  marginal
productivity of investment. In general, financial development will be positive
for  economic  growth.  But  some  improvements  in  risk-sharing  and  in  the
11credit market for households may decrease the saving rate and, hence, the
growth rate (Pagano, 1993).
Table 1: Share of Employment in Financial Services in Total Employment
(percentages)
Source: OECD, National Accounts (various issues)
Table 2: Share of Value-Added in Financial Services in GDP (percentages)
Source: OECD, National Accounts (various issues)
Table 3: Financial Intermediary Development over Time for About 150 Countries
(percentages)
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999, Figure 2A)
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1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Canada 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.1
France 1.8 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.8
Germany 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3
Japan 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Switzerland - - 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9
United Kingdom - 3.0 3.5 4.6 4.4 4.4
United States 3.8 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Canada 2.2 1.8 2.0 2.8 2.9 3.1
France 3.5 4.4 4.8 4.4 4.6 4.8
Germany 3.2 4.5 5.5 4.8 5.8 5.7
Japan 4.3 4.5 5.5 4.8 5.6 5.3
Netherlands 3.1 4.0 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.8
Switzerland - - 10.4 10.3 13.1 12.8
United States 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.1 7.2 7.1
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Liquid liabilities/GDP 32 39 47 51
Claims by deposit money banks on private 
sector/GDP 20 24 32 39There are different views on how the financial structure affects economic
growth exactly (Levine, 2000).
  The bank-based view holds that bank-based systems – particularly at early
stages of economic development – foster economic growth to a greater
degree than market-based systems.
  The  market-based  view  emphasizes  that  markets  provide  key  financial
services that stimulate innovation and long-run growth.
  The  financial  services  view  stresses  the  role  of  banks  and  markets  in
researching firms, exerting corporate control, creating risk management
devices,  and  mobilizing  society’s savings  for  the  most  productive
endeavors  in  tandem.  As  such,  it  does  regard  banks  and  markets  as
complements rather than substitutes as it focuses on the quality of the
financial services produced by the entire financial system.
  The  legal-based  view  rejects  the  analytical  validity  of  the  financial
structure  debate.  It  argues  that  the  legal  system  shapes  the  quality  of
financial services (for example La Porta et al., 1998). The legal-based view
stresses  that  the  component  of  financial  development  explained  by  the
legal system critically influences long-run growth. Political factors have
been introduced too, in order to explain the relationship between financial
and economic development (see Fohlin, 2000; Kroszner and Strahan, 2000;
Rajan and Zingales, 2000).
From empirical research of the relationship between economic and financial
development, it appears that history and path-dependency weigh very heavy
in determining the growth and design of financial institutions and markets.
Furthermore, idiosyncratic shocks that surprise institutions and markets over
time  appear  to  be  quite  important.  Despite  obvious  connections  among
political, legal, economic, and financial institutions and markets, long-term
causal relationships often prove to be elusive and appear to depend upon the
methodology chosen to study the relationship.
1 But it is important to realize
that efficient financial intermediation confers two important benefits: it raises
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1 For example, see Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Kaplan
and  Zingales,  1997;  Sala-i-Martin,  1997;  Fazzari  et  al.,  1988;  Levine  and  Zervos,  1998;
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Filer et al, 1999; Beck and Levine, 2000; Beck et al., 2000;
Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2000; Rousseau and Wachtel,
2000; Arestis et al., 2001; Wachtel, 2001.the level of investment and savings, and it increases the efficiency in the
allocation of financial funds in the economic system.
There  is  a structural  tendency  in  the  composition  of  national  wealth
represented in financial titles in many countries, especially the Anglo Saxon,
towards the substitution of bank held assets (bank loans etc.) by securitized
assets held by the public (equity, bonds) (Ross, 1989). This substitution is
often interpreted as a proof of the disintermediation process (e.g. Allen and
Santomero, 1997). However, this substitution does not imply that bank loans
are not growing any more. To the contrary, they continue to grow, even in the
U.S.  where  the  substitution  is  most  visible  (see  Boyd  and  Gertler,  1994;
Berger et al., 1995). Therefore, this substitution may not be interpreted as
a sign of a diminishing role of banking in general. This is because it is the
banks that play an essential role in the securitized instruments. They initiate,
arrange and underwrite the floating of these instruments. They often maintain
a secondary  market.  They  invent  a multitude  of  off-balance  instruments
derived from securities. They provide for the clearing of the deals. They are
the custodians of these constructions. They provide stock lending and they
finance market makers in options and futures. Thus, banks are crucial drivers
of financial innovation. Furthermore, it is still an unsolved question of how
the off-balance instruments should be counted in the statistics of national
wealth. Their huge notional amounts do not reflect the constantly varying
values  for  the  contracting  parties.  Banks  are  moving  in  an  off-balance
direction and their purpose is increasingly to develop and provide tradable
and non-tradable risk management instruments. And other kinds of financial
intermediaries play an increasingly important role in the same direction, both
in  securitized  and  non-tradable  instruments,  both  on-  and  off-balance:
insurance companies, pension funds, investments funds, market makers at
stock exchanges and derivative markets. These different kinds of financial
intermediaries  transform  risk  (concerning  future  income  or  accidents  or
interest rate fluctuations or stock price fluctuations, etc.). Risk transformation
and risk management is their job.
Thus, despite the globalization of financial services, driven by deregulation
and  information  technology  ,and  despite  strong  price  competition,  the
financial services industry is not declining in importance but it is growing.
This seems paradoxical. It points to something important which the modern
financial intermediation theory, and the neo-classical market theory on which
it is based, do not explain. Might it be the case that it overlooks something
crucial? Something that is to be related to information production but that is,
so far, not uncovered by the theory of financial intermediation?
14 Financial Intermediaries in the Economy4. Modern Theories of Financial Intermediation
In order to give firm ground to our argument and to illustrate the paradox, we
will first review the doctrines of the theory of financial intermediation.
2 These
are specifications, relevant to the financial services industry, of the agency
theory, and the theory of imperfect or asymmetric information. Basically, we
may distinguish between three lines of reasoning that aim at explaining the
raison d’être of financial intermediaries: information problems, transaction
costs and regulatory factors.
First,  and  that  used  in  most  studies  on  financial  intermediation,  is  the
informational asymmetries argument. These asymmetries can be of an ex ante
nature, generating adverse selection, they can be interim, generating moral
hazard, and they can be of an ex post nature, resulting in auditing or costly
state verification and enforcement. The informational asymmetries generate
market  imperfections,  i.e.  deviations  from  the  neoclassical  framework  in
Section 2. Many of these imperfections lead to specific forms of transaction
costs.  Financial  intermediaries  appear  to  overcome  these  costs,  at  least
partially.  For  example,  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  consider  banks  as
coalitions  of  depositors  that  provide  households  with  insurance  against
idiosyncratic shocks that adversely affect their liquidity position. Another
approach  is  based  on  Leland  and  Pyle  (1977).  They  interpret  financial
intermediaries as information sharing coalitions. Diamond (1984) shows that
these  intermediary  coalitions  can  achieve  economies  of  scale.  Diamond
(1984)  is  also  of  the  view  that  financial  intermediaries  act  as  delegated
monitors on behalf of ultimate savers. Monitoring will involve increasing
returns to scale, which implies that specializing may be attractive. Individual
households will delegate the monitoring activity to such a specialist, i.e. to the
financial  intermediary.  The  households  will  put  their  deposits  with  the
intermediary.  They  may  withdraw  the  deposits  in  order  to  discipline  the
intermediary in his monitoring function. Furthermore, they will positively
value the intermediary’s involvement in the ultimate investment (Hart, 1995).
Also, there can be assigned a positive incentive effect of short-term debt, and
in particular deposits, on bankers (Hart and Moore, 1995). For example, Qi
(1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that deposit finance can create
15
2 We have used the widely cited reviews by Allen, 1991; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Van
Damme, 1994; Freixas and Rochet 1997; Allen and Gale, 2000b; Gorton and Winton, 2002, as our
main sources in this section.the right incentives for a bank’s management. Illiquid assets of the bank result
in  a fragile  financial  structure  that  is  essential  for  disciplining  the  bank
manager. Note that in the case households that do not turn to intermediated
finance but prefer direct finance, there is still a “brokerage” role for financial
intermediaries, such as investment banks (see Baron, 1979 and 1982). Here,
the reputation effect is also at stake. In financing, both the reputation of the
borrower and that of the financier are relevant (Hart and Moore, 1998). Dinç
(2001)  studies  the  effects  of  financial  market  competition  on  a bank
reputation mechanism, and argues that the incentive for the bank to keep its
commitment is derived from its reputation, the number of competing banks
and  their  reputation,  and  the  competition  from  bond  markets. These  four
aspects clearly interact (see also Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993).
The “informational asymmetry” studies focus on the bank/borrower and the
bank/lender  relation  in  particular.  In  bank  lending  one  can  basically
distinguish  transactions-based  lending  (financial  statement  lending,  asset-
based lending, credit scoring, etc.) and relationship lending. In the former
class  information  that  is  relatively  easily  available  at  the  time  of  loan
origination is used. In the latter class, data gathered over the course of the
relationship with the borrower is used (see Lehman and Neuberger, 2001;
Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Berger and Udell, 2002). Central themes in the
bank/borrower relation are the screening and monitoring function of banks
(ex ante information asymmetries), the adverse selection problem (Akerlof,
1970), credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), the moral hazard problem
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983) and the ex post verification problem (Gale and
Hellwig, 1985). Central themes in the bank/lender relation are bank runs, why
they occur, how they can be prevented, and their economic consequences
(Kindleberger, 1989; Bernanke, 1983; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Another
avenue in the bank/lender relationship are models for competition between
banks for deposits in relation to their lending policy and the probability that
they fulfill their obligations (Boot, 2000; Diamond and Rajan, 2001).
Second is the transaction costs approach (examples are Benston and Smith,
1976; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Fama, 1980). In contrast to the first, this
approach does not contradict the assumption of complete markets. It is based
on  nonconvexities  in  transaction  technologies.  Here,  the  financial
intermediaries act as coalitions of individual lenders or borrowers who exploit
economies of scale or scope in the transaction technology. The notion of
transaction costs encompasses not only exchange or monetary transaction
costs (see Tobin, 1963; Towey, 1974; Fischer, 1983), but also search costs and
monitoring and auditing costs (Benston and Smith, 1976). Here, the role of
16 Modern Theories of Financial Intermediationthe financial intermediaries is to transform particular financial claims into
other types of claims (so-called qualitative asset transformation). As such,
they offer liquidity (Pyle, 1971) and diversification opportunities (Hellwig,
1991). The provision of liquidity is a key function for savers and investors
and  increasingly  for  corporate  customers,  whereas  the  provision  of
diversification increasingly is being appreciated in personal and institutional
financing. Holmström and Tirole (2001) suggest that this liquidity should
play a key role in asset pricing theory. The result is that unique characteristics
of bank loans emerge to enhance efficiency between borrower and lender. In
loan contract design, it is the urge to be able to efficiently bargain in later
(re)negotiations, rather than to fully assess current or expected default risk
that  structures  the  ultimate  contract  (Gorton  and  Kahn,  2000).  With
transaction costs, and in contrast to the information asymmetry approach, the
reason for the existence of financial intermediaries, namely transaction costs,
is exogenous. This is not fully the case in the third approach.
The third approach to explain the raison d’être of financial intermediaries is
based on the regulation of money production and of saving in and financing
of the economy (see Guttentag and Lindsay, 1968; Fama, 1980; Mankiw,
1986; Merton, 1995b). Regulation affects solvency and liquidity with the
financial  institution.  Diamond  and  Rajan  (2000)  show  that  bank  capital
affects bank safety, the bank’s ability to refinance, and the bank’s ability to
extract repayment from borrowers or its willingness to liquidate them. The
legal-based view especially (see Section 3), sees regulation as a crucial factor
that shapes the financial economy (La Porta et al., 1998). Many view financial
regulations  as  something  that  is  completely  exogenous  to  the  financial
industry. However, the activities of the intermediaries inherently “ask for
regulation”. This is because they, the banks in particular, by the way and the
art  of  their  activities  (i.e.  qualitative  asset  transformation),  are  inherently
insolvent and illiquid (for the example of deposit insurance, see Merton and
Bodie, 1993). Furthermore, money and its value, the key raw material of the
financial services industry, to a large extent is both defined and determined by
the  nation  state,  i.e.  by  regulating  authorities  par excellence.  Safety  and
soundness of the financial system as a whole and the enactment of industrial,
financial, and fiscal policies are regarded as the main reasons to regulate the
financial industry (see Kareken, 1986; Goodhart, 1987; Boot and Thakor,
1993). Also, the financial history shows a clear interplay between financial
institutions and markets and the regulators, be it the present-day specialized
financial supervisors or the old-fashioned sovereigns (Kindleberger, 1993).
Regulation of financial intermediaries, especially of banks, is costly. There
are the direct costs of administration and of employing the supervisors, and
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prudential supervision. Regulation however, may also generate rents for the
regulated financial intermediaries, since it may hamper market entry as well
as  exit.  So,  there  is  a true  dynamic  relationship  between  regulation  and
financial production. It must be noted that, once again, most of the literature
in  this  category  focuses  on  explaining  the  functioning  of  the  financial
intermediary with regulation as an exogenous force. Kane (1977) and Fohlin
(2000) attempt to develop theories that explain the existence of the very
extensive  regulation  of  financial  intermediaries  when  they  go  into  the
dynamics of financial regulation.
3
Thus,  to  summarize,  according  to  the  modern  theory  of  financial
intermediation,  financial  intermediaries  are  active  because  market
imperfections prevent savers and investors from trading directly with each
other in an optimal way. The most important market imperfections are the
informational  asymmetries  between  savers  and  investors.  Financial
intermediaries, banks specifically, fill – as agents and as delegated monitors
– information gaps between ultimate savers and investors. This is because
they have a comparative informational advantage over ultimate savers and
investors. They screen and monitor investors on behalf of savers. This is their
basic function, which justifies the transaction costs they charge to parties.
They also bridge the maturity mismatch between savers and investors and
facilitate  payments  between  economic  parties  by  providing  a payment,
settlement and clearing system. Consequently, they engage in qualitative asset
transformation  activities.  To  ensure  the  sustainability  of  financial
intermediation,  safety  and  soundness  regulation  has  to  be  put  in  place.
Regulation  also  provides  the  basis  for  the  intermediaries  to  enact  in  the
production of their monetary services.
All  studies  on  the  reasons  behind  financial  intermediation  focus  on  the
functioning  of  intermediaries  in  the  intermediation  process;  they  do  not
examine the existence of the real-world intermediaries as such. It appears that
the latter issue is regarded to be dealt with when satisfactory answers on the
former are being provided. Market optimization is the main point of reference
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3 The importance of regulation for the existence of the financial intermediary can best be
understood if one is prepared to account for the historical and institutional setting of financial
intermediation (see Kindleberger, 1993; Merton, 1995b). Interestingly, and illustrating the crucial
importance of regulation for financial intermediation, is that there are some authors who suggest
that unregulated finance or ‘free banking’ would be highly desirable, as it would be stable and
inflation-free. Proponents of this view are, among others, White, 1984; Selgin, 1987; Dowd, 1989.in case of the functioning of the intermediaries. The studies that appear in
most academic journals analyze situations and conditions under which banks
or  other  intermediaries  are  making  markets  less  imperfect  as  well  as  the
impediments to their optimal functioning. Perfect markets are the benchmarks
and the intermediating parties are analyzed and judged from the viewpoint of
their contribution to an optimal allocation of savings, that means to market
perfection. Ideally, financial intermediaries should not be there and, being
there, they at best alleviate market imperfections as long as the real market
parties have no perfect information. On the other hand, they maintain market
imperfections  as  long  as  they  do  not  completely  eliminate  informational
asymmetries,  and  even  increase  market  imperfections  when  their  risk
aversion creates credit crunches. So, there appears not to be a heroic role for
intermediaries at all! But if this is really true, why are these weird creatures
still in business, even despite the fierce competition amongst themselves? Are
they truly dinosaurs, completely unaware of the extinction they will face in
the  very  near  future?  This  seems  highly  unlikely.  Section  3  showed  and
argued  that  the  financial  intermediaries  are  alive  and  kicking. They  have
a crucial  and  even  increasing  role  within  the  real-world  economy.  They
increasingly are linked up in all kinds of economic transactions and processes.
Therefore, the next section is a critical assessment of the modern theory of
financial intermediation in the face of the real-world behavior and impact of
financial institutions and markets.
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Two issues are of key importance. The first is about why we demand banks
and other kinds of financial intermediaries. The answer to this question, in our
opinion,  is  risk  management  rather  than  informational  asymmetries  or
transaction costs. Economies of scale and scope as well as the delegation of
the screening and monitoring function especially apply to dealing with risk
itself, rather than only with information. The second issue that matters is why
banks and other financial institutions are willing and able to take on the risks
that are inevitably involved in their activity. In this respect, it is important to
note that financial intermediaries are able to create comparative advantages
with respect to information acquisition and processing in relation to their
sheer size in relation to the customer whereby they are able to manage risk
more  efficiently.  We  suggest  Schumpeter’s view  of  entrepreneurs  as
innovators and Merton’s functional perspective of financial intermediaries in
tandem are very helpful in this respect.
One should question whether the existence of financial intermediaries and the
structural development of financial intermediation can be fully explained by
a theoretical  framework  based  on  the  neo-classical  concept  of  perfect
competition. The mainstream theory of financial intermediation, as it has
been developed in the past few decades, has – without any doubt – provided
numerous  valuable  insights  into  the  behavior  of  banks  and  other
intermediaries and their managers in the financial markets under a broad
variety of perceived and observed circumstances. For example, the “agency
revolution”,  unleashed  by  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976),  focussed  on
principal-agent relation asymmetries. Contracts and conflicts of interest on all
levels inside and outside the firm in a world full of information asymmetries
became the central theme in the analysis of financial decisions. Important
aspects of financial decisions, which previously went unnoticed in the neo-
classical theory, could be studied in this approach, and a “black box” of
financial decision making was opened. But the power of the agency theory is
also her weakness: it mainly explains ad hoc situations; new models based on
different combinations of assumptions continuously extend it.
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4 To this extent, one can draw a striking parallel with the traditional Newtonian view of the
natural world. The planetary orbits round the Sun can be explained very well with the Newtonian
laws of gravitation and force. Apparent anomalies in the orbital movement of Neptune turned out
to be caused by the influence of an hitherto unknown planet (Pluto). Its (predicted) astronomicalfinancial decisions, information differences and, as a consequence, conflicts
of  interest,  play  a role.  Focussed  on  these  aspects,  the  agency  theory  is
capable  of  investigating  nearly  every  contingency  in  the  interaction  of
economic agents deviating from what they would have done in a market with
perfect  foresight  and  equal  incentives  for  all  agents.  However,  the
applications from agency theory have mainly anecdotal value; they are tested
in a multitude of specific cases. But the theory fails to evolve into a general
and  coherent  explanation  of  what  is  the  basic  function  of  financial
intermediaries in the markets and the economy as a whole.
Various  researchers  interested  in  real  world  financial  phenomena  have
pointed out that banks in particular do make a difference. They come up with
empirical evidence that banks are special. For example, Fama (1985) and
James  (1987)  analyze  the  incidence  of  the  implicit  tax  due  to  reserve
requirements. Both conclude that bank loans are special, as bank CDs have
not  been  eliminated  by  non-bank  alternatives  that  bear  no  reserve
requirements. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) look at the
abnormal  returns  associated  with  announcements  of  different  types  of
security offerings and find a positive response to bank loans. Lummer and
McConnel (1989) and Best and Zhang (1993) have confirmed these results.
Slovin et al. (1993) look into the adverse effect on the borrower in case
a borrower’s bank  fails.  They  find  Continental  Illinois  borrowers  incur
significant negative abnormal returns during the bank’s impending failure.
Gibson (1995) finds similar results when studying the effects of the health of
Japanese banks on borrowers. Gilson et al. (1990) find that the likelihood of
a successful debt restructuring by a firm in distress is positively related to the
extent of that firm’s reliance on bank borrowing. James (1996) finds that the
higher the proportion of total debt held by the bank, the higher the likelihood
the  bank  debt  will  be  impaired,  and  so  the  higher  the  likelihood  that  it
participates in the restructuring. Hoshi et al. (1991) for Japan and Fohlin
(1998) and Gorton and Schmid (1999) for Germany also find that in these
countries, banks provide valuable services that cannot be replicated in capital
markets. Current intermediation theory treats such observations often as an
anomaly.  But,  in  our  perspective,  it  relates  rather  to  the  insufficient
explanatory power of the current theory of financial intermediation.
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observation was regarded as an even greater victory for Newtonian theory. However, it took
Einstein and Bohr to reveal that this theory is only a limit case as it is completely unable to deal
with the behavior of microparticles (see Couper and Henbest, 1985; Ferris, 1988; Hawking, 1988).The  basic  reason  for  the  insufficient  explanatory  power  of  the  present
intermediation theory has, in our opinion, to be sought in the paradigm of
asymmetrical information. Markets are imperfect, according to this paradigm,
because the ultimate parties who operate in the markets have insufficient
information to conclude a transaction by themselves. Financial intermediaries
position themselves as agents (“middlemen”) between savers and investors,
alleviating information asymmetries against transaction costs to a level where
total savings are absorbed by real investments at equilibrium real interest rates.
But in the real world, financial intermediaries do not consider themselves
agents  who  intermediate  between  savers  and  investors  by  procuring
information on investors to savers and by selecting and monitoring investors
on behalf of savers. That is not their job. They deal in money and in risk, not
in information per se. Information production predominantly is a means to the
end  of  risk  management.  In  the  real  world,  borrowers,  lenders,  savers,
investors and financial supervisors look at them in the same way, i.e. risk
managers instead of information producers. Financial intermediaries deal in
financial services, created by themselves, mostly for their own account, via
their balance sheet, so for their own risk. They attract savings from the saver
and lend it to the investor, adding value by meeting the specific needs of
savers  and  investors  at  prices  that  equilibrate  the  supply  and  demand  of
money. This  is  a creative  process,  which  cannot  be  characterized  by  the
reduction  of  information  asymmetries.  In  the  intermediation  process  the
financial intermediary transforms savings, given the preferences of the saver
with respect to liquidity and risk, into investments according to the needs and
the risk profile of the investor. It might be clear that for these reasons the
views of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on the bank as
a coalition of depositors, of Akerlof (1970) and Leland and Pyle (1977) on the
bank as an information sharing coalition, and of Diamond (1984) on the bank
as delegated (...) monitor, do not reflect at all the view of bankers on their own
role. Nor does it reflect the way in which society experiences their existence.
Even with perfect information, the time and risk preferences of savers and
investors  fail  to  be  matched  completely  by  the  price  (interest  rate)
mechanism:  there  are  (too  many)  missing  markets.  It  is  the  financial
intermediary that somehow has to make do with these missing links. The
financial intermediary manages risks in order to allow for the activities of
other types of households within the economy.
One would expect that the theory of the firm would pay ample attention to the
driving forces behind entrepreneurial activity and could thus explain in more
general terms the existence of financial intermediation as an entrepreneurial
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is preoccupied with the functioning of the corporate enterprise in the context
of market structures and competition processes. In the wake of Coase (1937),
the  corporate  enterprise  is  part  of  the  market  structure  and  can  even  be
considered as an alternative for the market. This view laid the foundation for
the transaction cost theory (see Williamson, 1988), for the agency theory
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and for the theory of asymmetric information
(see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and 1983). Essential in the approaches of these
theories  is  that  the  corporate  enterprise  is  not  treated  as  a “black  box”,
a uniform entity, as was the case in the traditional micro-economic theory of
the firm. It is regarded as a coalition of interests operating as a market by
itself and optimizing the opposing and often conflicting interests of different
stakeholders (clients, personnel, financiers, management, public authorities,
non-governmental organizations). The rationale of the corporate enterprise is
that  it  creates  goods  and  services,  which  cannot  be  produced,  or  only  at
a higher price, by consumers themselves. This exclusive function justifies
transaction  costs,  which  are  seen  as  a form  of  market  imperfection. The
mainstream theory of the firm evolved under the paradigm of the agency
theory and the transaction costs theory as a theory of economic organization
rather than as a theory of entrepreneurship.
A separate line of thinking in the theory of the firm is the dynamic market
approach  of  Schumpeter  (1912),  who  stressed  the  essential  function  of
entrepreneurs  as  innovators,  creating  new  products  and  new  distribution
methods in order to gain competitive advantage in constantly developing and
changing  markets.  In  this  approach,  markets  and  enterprises  are  in
a continuous  process  of  “creative  destruction”  and  the  entrepreneurial
function  is  pre-eminently  dynamic.  Basic  inventions  are  more  or  less
exogenous to the economic system; their supply is perhaps influenced by
market demand in some way, but their genesis lies outside the existing market
structure. Entrepreneurs seize upon these basic inventions and transform them
into economic innovations. The successful innovators reap large short-term
profits, which are soon bid away by imitators. The effect of the innovations is
to disequilibrate and to alter the existing market structure, until the process
eventually settles down in wait for the next (wave of) innovation. The result
is a punctuated pattern of economic development that is perceived as a series
of business cycles. Financial intermediaries, the ones that mobilize savings,
allocate  capital,  manage  risk,  ease  transactions,  and  monitor  firms,  are
essential  for  economic  growth  and  development.  That  is  what  Joseph
Schumpeter argued early in this century. Now there is evidence to support
Schumpeter’s view: financial services promote development (see King and
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2001).  The  conceptual  link  runs  as  follows:  Intermediaries  can  promote
growth  by  increasing  the  fraction  of  resources  society  saves  and/or  by
improving the ways in which society allocates savings. Consider investments
in firms. There are large research, legal, and organizational costs associated
with  such  investment.  These  costs  can  include  evaluating  the  firm,
coordinating financing for the firm if more than one investor is involved, and
monitoring managers. The costs might be prohibitive for any single investor,
but an intermediary could perform these tasks for a group of investors and
lower the costs per investor. So, by researching many firms and by allocating
credit  to  the  best  ones,  intermediaries  can  improve  the  allocation  of
society’s resources.  Intermediaries  can  also  diversify  risks  and  exploit
economies of scale. For example, a firm may want to fund a large project with
high  expected  returns,  but  the  investment  may  require  a large  lump-sum
capital  outlay. An  individual  investor  may  have  neither  the  resources  to
finance the entire project nor the desire to devote a disproportionate part of
savings  to  a single  investment.  Thus  profitable  opportunities  can  go
unexploited  without  intermediaries  to  mobilize  and  allocate  savings.
Intermediaries do much more than passively decide whether to fund projects.
They  can  initiate  the  creation  and  transformation  of  firms’ activities.
Intermediaries  also  provide  payment,  settlement,  clearing  and  netting
services.  Modern  economies,  replete  with  complex  interactions,  require
secure  mechanisms  to  settle  transactions.  Without  these  services,  many
activities  would  be  impossible,  and  there  would  be  less  scope  for
specialization,  with  a corresponding  loss  in  efficiency.  In  addition  to
improving resource allocation, financial intermediaries stimulate individuals
to  save  more  efficiently  by  offering  attractive  instruments  that  combine
attributes of depositing, investing and insuring. The securities most useful to
entrepreneurs – equities, bonds, bills of exchange – may not have the exact
liquidity, security, and risk characteristics savers desire. By offering attractive
financial instruments to savers – deposits, insurance policies, mutual funds,
and, especially, combinations thereof – intermediaries determine the fraction
of resources that individuals save. Intermediaries affect both the quantity and
the quality of society’s output devoted to productive activities. Intermediaries
also tailor financial instruments to the needs of firms. Thus firms can issue,
and savers can hold, financial instruments more attractive to their needs than
if intermediaries did not exist. Innovations can also spur the development of
financial  services.  Improvements  in  computers  and  communications  have
triggered  financial  innovations  over  the  past  20  years.  Perhaps,  more
important  for  developing  countries,  growth  can  increase  the  demand  for
financial services, sparking their adoption.
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ends  up  at  the  so-called  functional  perspective  (see  Merton,  1995a). The
functions  performed  by  the  financial  intermediaries  are  providing
a transactions and payments system, a mechanism for the pooling of funds to
undertake projects, ways and means to manage uncertainty and to control risk
and provide price information. The key functions remain the same, the way
they  are  conducted  varies  over  time.  This  looks  quite  similar  to  what
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) regard as the qualitative asset transformation
operations  of  financial  intermediaries,  resulting  from  informational
asymmetries. However, in our perspective, it is not a set of operations per se
but the function of the intermediaries that gives way to their presence in the
real world. Of course, we are well aware of the fact that in the real-world the
everyday performance of these different functions can be experienced by
clients as – to quote Boot (2000) – ”an annoying set of transactions”.
The key functions of financial intermediaries are fairly stable over time. But
the agents that are able and willing to perform them are not necessarily so.
And neither are the focus and the instruments of the financial supervisors. An
insurance company in 2000 is quite dissimilar in its products and distribution
channels from one in 1990 or 1960. And a bank in Germany is quite different
from  one  in  the  UK.  Very  different  financial  institutions  and  also  very
different financial services can be developed to provide the de facto function.
Furthermore, we have witnessed waves of financial innovations, consider
swaps,  options,  futures,  warrants,  asset  backed  securities,  MTNs,  NOW
accounts,  LBOs,  MBOs  and  MBIs, ATMs,  EFTPOS,  and  the  distribution
revolution  leading  to  e-finance  (e.g.  see  Finnerty,  1992;  Claessens  et  al.,
2000;  Allen  et  al.,  2002).  From  this,  financial  institutions  and  markets
increasingly are in part complementary and in part substitutes in providing the
financial functions (see also Gorton and Pennacchi, 1992; Levine, 1997).
Merton (1995a) suggests a path of the development of financial functions.
Instead of a secular trend, away from intermediaries towards markets, he
acknowledges a much more cyclical trend, moving back and forth between
the two (see also Rajan and Zingales, 2000). Merton argues that although
many  financial  products  tend  to  move  secularly  from  intermediaries  to
markets, the providers of a given function (i.e. the financial intermediaries
themselves)  tend  to  oscillate  according  to  the  product-migration  and
development cycle. Some products also move in the opposite direction, for
example the mutual fund industry changed the composition of the portfolios
of US households substantially, that is, from direct held stock to indirect
investments via mutual funds (Barth et al., 1997). In our view, this mutual
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increasing role for intermediated finance in the modern economy.
Thus, in our opinion, one should view the financial intermediaries from an
evolutionary perspective. They perform a crucial economic function in all
times and in all places. However, the form they have changes with time and
place.  Maybe  once  they  were  giants,  dinosaurs  so  to  say,  in  the  US.
Nowadays, they are no longer that powerful but they did not lose their key
function, their economic niche. Instead, they evolved into much smaller and
less visible types of business, just like the dinosaurs evolved into the much
smaller omnipresent birds.
Note that most of the theoretical and empirical literature actually refers to
banks  (as  a particular  form  of  financial  intermediary)  rather  than  to  all
financial institutions conducting financial intermediation services. However,
the bank of the 21
st century completely differs from the bank that operated in
most of the 20
th century. Both its on- and off-balance sheet activities show
a qualitatively  different  composition.  That  is,  away  from  purely  interest
related  lending  and  borrowing  business  towards  fee  and  provision  based
insurance-investment-advice-management  business. At  the  same  time,  the
traditional insurance, investment and pension funds enter the world of lending
and  financing. As  such,  financial  institutions  tend  to  become  both  more
similar and more complex organisations. Thus, it appears that the traditional
banking theories relate to the creation of loans and deposits by banks, whereas
this increasingly becomes a smaller part of their business. This is not only
because  of  the  changing  composition  of  their  income  structure  (not  only
interest-related income but also fee-based income). Also it is the case because
of  the  blurring  borders  between  the  operations  of  the  different  kinds  of
financial  intermediaries.  Therefore,  we  argue  first  that  the  loan  and  the
deposit only are a means to an end – which is acknowledged both by the bank
and the customer – and that the bank and the non-bank financial intermediary
increasingly develop qualitatively different (financial) instruments to manage
risks.
Questioning whether informational asymmetry is the principal explanatory
variable of the financial intermediation process – what we do – does not imply
denial of the pivotal role information plays in the financial intermediation
process.  On  the  contrary,  under  the  strong  influence  of  modern
communication technologies and of the worldwide liberalization of financial
services,  the  character  of  the  financial  intermediation  process  is  rapidly
changing. This causes a – until now only relative – decrease in traditional
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the counterpart of this process – the increasing role of the capital markets
where savers and investors deal in marketable securities thanks to world wide
real time information – would be completely unthinkable without the growing
and  innovating  role  of  financial  intermediaries  (like  investment  banks,
securities  brokers,  institutional  investors,  finance  companies,  investment
funds,  mergers  and  acquisition  consultants,  rating  agencies,  etc.).  They
facilitate the entrepreneurial process, provide bridge finance and invent new
financial instruments in order to bridge different risk preferences of market
parties by means of derivatives. It would be a misconception to interpret the
relatively  declining  role  of  traditional  banks,  from  the  perspective  of  the
financial sector as a whole, as a general process of disintermediation. To the
contrary, the increasing number of different types of intermediaries in the
financial  markets  and  their  increasing  importance  as  financial  innovators
point to a swelling process of intermediation. Banks reconfirm their positions
as  engineers  and  facilitators  of  capital  market  transactions.  The  result  is
a secular upward trend in the ratio of financial assets to real assets in all
economies from the 1960s onwards (see Table 3).
It  appears  that  informational  asymmetries  are  not  well-integrated  into
a dynamic  approach  of  the  development  of  financial  intermedation  and
innovation.  Well-considered,  information,  and  the  ICT revolution,  plays
a paradoxical  role  in  this  process.  The  ICT revolution  certainly  has  an
excluding effect on intermediary functions in that it bridges informational
gaps between savers and investors and facilitates them to deal directly in open
markets. This function of ICT promotes the exchange of generally tradable,
thus uniform products, and leads to the commoditizing of financial assets. But
the  ICT revolution  provokes  still  another,  and  essentially  just  as
revolutionary,  effect,  namely  the  customizing of  financial  products  and
services.  Modern  network  systems  and  product  software  foster  the
development of ever more sophisticated, specific, finance and investment
products, often embodying option-like structures on both contracting parties
which are developed in specific deals, thus “tailor made”, and which are not
tradable in open markets. Examples are specific financing and investment
schemes  (tax  driven  private  equity  deals),  energy  finance  and  transport
finance projects, etc. They give competitive advantages to both contracting
parties, who often are opposed to public knowledge of the specifics of the
deal (especially when tax aspects are involved). So, general trading of these
contracts is normally impossible and, above all, not aimed at. (But imitation
after a certain time lag can seldom be prevented!) Informational data (on
stock  prices,  interest  and  exchange  rates,  commodity  and  energy  prices,
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products and project finance constructions. In this respect, information is
attracting a pivotal role in the intermediation function because it is mostly the
intermediation industry, not the ultimate contract parties that develop these
new  products  and  services.  The  function  of  information  in  this  process,
however,  differs  widely  from  that  in  the  present  intermediation  theory.
Intermediaries are, in this evolutionary development of their basic functions,
not busy by alleviating asymmetric information problems between market
parties, but by providing unique information to market parties as an integral
part of their intermediary function. In this role, the intermediaries are not
victims  of  the  ICT revolution,  bound  to  be  excluded,  but  beneficiaries,
grateful for the opportunities ICT creates. They use it in their innovative
products and they stimulate the growth of ICT. Their move into e-banking /
e-finance is a spectacular example of this development. It appears that the
ICT revolution has not so much led to the end of intermediation, but rather to
new methods and types of intermediation. Transaction costs do not disappear
because of this revolution, but they take a different form, namely as costs for
information gathering, selection, and processing. Traditional transaction costs
indeed are reduced. Informational innovations have an increasing impact on
financial product development and risk management. Financial innovation
focuses on risk management, especially of currency, interest rate and credit
risk (Caouette et al., 1998; Saunders, 1999). Allen and Gale (1997, 2000a)
point at this role for financial intermediaries when they assess the impact of
shocks via the financial system on the real economy. However, they do not go
into the theoretical consequences.
In the next sections, we come up with the rationale for an alternative approach
of financial intermediation and present building blocks for an alternative for
informational asymmetry as the key rationale for the existence and behavior
of financial intermediaries.
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When  information  asymmetries  are  not  the  driving  force  behind
intermediation activity and their elimination is not the commercial motive for
financial  intermediaries,  the  question  arises  which  paradigm,  as  an
alternative, could better express the essence of the intermediation process. In
our opinion, the concept of value creation in the context of the value chain
might serve that purpose. And, in our opinion, it is risk and risk management
that drives this value creation. The concept of value creation, introduced by
Michael Porter (1985), can be seen as a dynamic extension of the theory of
industrial organization, in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter. It represents
the other side of the coin, which glitters in the theory of the firm: transaction
costs are incurred to create value. It is amazing that the value added approach,
now widely recognized and applied in the literature on business organization,
management and finance (e.g. EVA, Economic Value Added; see Damodaran,
1996; Grinblatt and Titman, 1998), has not yet been widely used to explicitly
explain the operations of the financial industry. There are a few noticeable
exceptions:  Jordi  Canals  (1993)  describes  the  value  creation  process  in
banking in his book “Competitive Strategies in European Banking”, making
reference to Porter. However, he does not elaborate on this concept to create
an alternative to the existing paradigm of financial intermediation. Nor does
he go into depth to explain the basic process of value creation by financial
intermediaries. David Llewellyn’s concept of contract banking is also based
on the value chain idea (Llewellyn, 1999). But here too, there emerges no
alternative for the mainstream view on financial intermediation.
What value do financial intermediaries add? They offer financial services,
embodied  in  financial  instruments,  to  savers  and  (real)  investors.  These
instruments are not created by savers and investors themselves and, in many
cases, cannot be created by them individually. This value creation process is
intensified by the competition in the market place between existing financial
institutions and by new entrants, which strongly stimulates the innovation of
new financial products in order to compensate for profit erosion on existing,
standard products. The contemporary banking theory distinguishes between
four main banking functions: payment services, asset transformation, risk
management and information processing, and borrowers monitoring. All four
aim at the active offering of financial services and instruments to market
parties according to their needs and preferences. Intermediaries must translate
needs and preferences of savers and investors into appropriate services and
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in an endless stream of new products: All kinds of payment accounts, credit
cards, on line payment facilities, overdraft facilities, letters of credit, medium
term credits, revolving credits, rollovers, commercial paper financing, asset
backed  financing,  cash  flow  based  project  finance,  deposit  arrangements,
money market funds, savings accounts, insurance linked savings instruments,
investment linked mortgage financing, unit linked pension schemes, equities,
bonds  and  hybrids  between  these,  warrants,  custody,  stock  lending,  trust
services and last but not least the vastly increasing number of derivative
instruments, listed on exchanges and increasingly over-the-counter. All these
products  are  developed  by  the  financial  industry  –  mostly  banks  and
insurance  companies  –  and  not  by  the  ultimate  savers  and  investors
themselves.  It  is  the  financial  intermediary  who  innovates  and  whose
marketing efforts aim at the use of the innovation (see also Merton, 1995a, b).
As soon as others imitate financial instruments, especially when they are
standardized and made tradable in open markets, strong competition threatens
all offering market parties. A rational answer of the financial entrepreneur to
imitating behavior is to develop new, specialized instruments for new specific
markets. As soon as an open, transparent market with standardized products
is developed, that means as soon as the stage of a ‘perfect market’is reached,
market parties try to escape extinction – resulting from the truly zero profits
that perfect competition might incur – by creating new submarkets with new
specific  products.  In  this  respect,  we  may  draw  a parallel  with  Kelvin
Lancaster’s approach in microeconomic analysis, which posits that products
are simply bundles of characteristics (Lancaster, 1966). Similarly, financial
products are permutations of different characteristics that are mostly based on
risk  management.  Financial  institutions  try  to  survive  by  market
differentiation, by “fragmenting” the market for financial products into an
ever-growing number of submarkets for their special products. This means
that the function of intermediaries is not to bridge as agents an information
gap between market parties and by doing so to decrease market imperfection,
but to create, as risk transformers, new markets. Because they add value to
clients, these clients are not interested in the full transparency of the deal to
other  market  participants.  Sometimes,  they  will  even  be  opposed  to
immediate transparency of a new product, in particular when these clients
have incurred costs for the development of the value received. So, newly
developed  submarkets  essentially  are  imperfect.  Competing  financial
institutions will, however, as soon as new markets show success, imitate the
new product, standardize it as far as possible and, by doing so, make the
market  more  transparent,  and  thus  more  perfect.  Facilitated  by  the  ICT
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financial intermediary that results in market differentiation, results also in
temporary  situations  of  monopolistic  competition  or  even  monopoly,  that
inherently undermines the perfect market.
The financial instruments are in most cases not developed to be traded between
savers and investors in open markets – listed securities and derivatives being
the only exception – but to be offered by financial institutions in one-to-one
transactions. Their capital strength, liquidity, professionalism, and reputation
of trust and confidentiality are key assets here. The current intermediation
theory  assumes  that  financial  services  are  commodities,  uniform  tradable
goods  responding  completely  to  the  needs  and  preferences  of  savers  and
investors  at  a price  and  that  the  function  of  the  financial  intermediation
industry  is  to  mediate  between  savers  and  investors  by  providing  them
information on the commodity. But that essentially is only the function of the
stockbroker on the stock exchange. All other financial intermediaries do not
restrict their activities to intermediation in that strict sense. They transform
deposited amounts into amounts needed for financing real investments, they
absorb counterparty risk by providing loans to entrepreneurs and duration risk
by guaranteeing liquidity to savers. Insurance companies and pension funds
also provide and guarantee liquidity to savers, be it under other, more specific,
conditions than banks. Viewing the financial product as a bundle of attributes
in the tradition of Lancaster (1966) appears to be more fruitful as this is indeed
helpful to understand the dynamics of the financial world.
Thus,  contemporary  banking  theory  rightly  points  out  that  financial
intermediaries  have  a role  in  both  brokerage  and  qualitative  asset
transformation. But contemporary banking theory wrongly concentrates on
informational asymmetries to explain financial intermediation. These only
suffice to understand the brokerage function. However, to a large extent, it
fails  to  understand  the  qualitative  asset  transformation  function  of  the
intermediaries. To explain this function, we are indeed in need of a different
–  functional,  as  Merton  (1995a,  b)  puts  it  –  perspective  of  financial
intermediaries.
In our opinion, risk is not playing the central role it deserves in the financial
intermediation  theory.  Allen  and  Santomero  (1997)  make  the  same
observation,  but  only  to  a limited  extent.  They  review  the  state  of
intermediation theory and attempt to reconcile it with the observed behavior
of  institutions  in  modern  capital  markets.  They  argue  that  many  current
theories of intermediation are too heavily focused on functions of institutions
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focus  on  products  and  services  that  are  of  decreasing  importance  to  the
intermediaries, while they are unable to account for those activities which
have become the central focus of many institutions. They suggest that the
literature’s emphasis on the role of intermediaries as reducing the frictions of
transaction  costs  and  asymmetric  information  is  too  strong;  while  these
factors may once have been central to the role of intermediaries, they are
increasingly  less  relevant.  In  its  place,  the  authors  offer  a view  of
intermediaries that centers on two different roles these firms currently play:
they  are  facilitators  of  risk  transfer  and  they  deal  with  the  increasingly
complex maze of financial instruments and markets. Risk management has
become a key area of intermediation activity, though intermediation theory
has offered little to explain why institutions should perform this function. In
addition,  they  argue  that  the  facilitation  of  participation  in  the  financial
markets is an important service provided by these firms. Allen and Santomero
suggest that reducing participation costs, which are the costs of learning about
effectively using markets as well as participating in them on a day to day
basis, play an important role in understanding the changes that have taken
place. We disputed that risk management is only of recent importance to the
financial  industry  earlier  on  (Scholtens  and  van  Wensveen,  2000).
Furthermore, we doubt the crucial importance of lower participation costs for
the understanding of the current activities of intermediaries. Risk absorption,
and therefore risk management, is and has always been their raison d’être.
In the current theory of financial intermediation, risk appears as a negatively
operating, almost peripheral, factor. It is thought to result in adverse selection,
credit rationing and moral hazard, which results in effects that frustrate the
optimal allocation of savings. The absorption of risk, however, is the central
function of both banking and insurance. The risk function bridges a mismatch
between the supply of savings and the demand for investments as savers are
on average more risk averse than investors. Risk, that means maturity risk,
counterparty risk, market risk (interest rate and stock prices), life expectancy,
income expectancy risk etc., is the core business of the financial industry.
Financial intermediaries can absorb risk on the scale required by the market
because their scale permits a sufficiently diversified portfolio of investments
needed to offer the security required by savers and policyholders. Financial
intermediaries are not just agents who screen and monitor on behalf of savers.
They  are  active  counterparts  themselves  offering  a specific  product  that
cannot be offered by individual investors to savers, namely the cover for risk.
They use their reputation and their balance sheet and off-balance items, rather
than their very limited own funds, to act as such counterparts.
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around  risk:  risk  as  a threat,  as  the  possibility  of  a loss,  but  also  as  an
opportunity  for  profit.  Swaps,  options,  futures  are  the  most  illustrative
examples  of  that,  but  also  warrants  on  equities  and  a variety  of  hybrid
instruments between shares and bonds, term loans with variable maturities,
interest rate caps and floors, credit derivatives, combined mortgage finance
investments plans, mortgage backed life insurance saving plans, unit trust
investments plans, etc. But not only in the recent past: risk is and has always
been the heart of the insurance industry and also of banking. The process of
risk  transformation  is  expressed  in  their  balance  sheets  and  in  their  off-
balance  sheet  items.  Banks  also  push  the  development  and  marketing  of
financial  instruments  traded  at  stock  exchanges.  The  marketing  of  these
instruments implies a risk taking commitment, at least temporary, by banks
when  they  underwrite  the  public  issue  of  these  titles.  Furthermore,  it  is
important to note that parallel to the growing volume of instruments traded at
the stock exchanges, where banks act as brokers, there is a strongly growing
volume  of  bilaterally  traded  risk  instruments  like  future  rate  agreements,
currency and interest rate swaps and options with tailor made conditions
(exotic options), where banks are both the developers and the counterparties
in the deal themselves.
Thus,  in  effect,  financial  innovation  involves  creating  instruments  with
different  combinations  of  existing  characteristics  rather  than  entirely  new
ones. When all possible combinations would have been created, we are in the
Arrow-Debreu world. However, under the Moon, we have zillions of missing
markets. Financial innovations inch us slowly to the Arrow-Debreu world but
in  the  meantime  this  world  gets  further  and  further  away  and,  therefore,
heaven on Earth becomes even more difficult to achieve.
So, risk transformation, not dealing with information and agency problems, is
at  the  heart  of  financial  intermediation.
5 Risk,  and  not  asymmetric
information fuels its activity and risk taking basically determines the value
addition  of  financial  intermediation  to  national  income.  The  growing
importance of risk and the growing need of risk absorbing institutions and
instruments can explain the growing importance of the financial industry to
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5 Hakenes (2002) is an example of a study that puts risk management at the core of the theory
of banking. Banks are not delegated monitors, but delegated managers. However, Hakenes does
not include the investor’s and depositor’s perspective in his analysis. And, essentially, it is the
combination  of  lending  and  investing  and  accepting  money  that  distinguishes  the  financial
intermediary from other types of organisations.the national income. The demand for risk covering instruments grows and
will continue to grow, under the increasing volatility of interest rates, stock
prices and foreign exchange rates. The invention of new instruments and the
adaptation of existing ones to specific, tailormade solutions for specific needs
of debtors or creditors is an answer to that need and also to the growing
competition within the financial industry and from outside.
6
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6 One may wonder whether “informational asymmetry” does not include “risk”, since lack of
transparency in a specific (bargaining) situation involves a risk for at least one of the contracting
parties. This is true, but “risk” involves more than uncertainty by a lack of complete information.
“Risk” predominantly refers to a chance of unpredictable emergencies for both contracting parties.
In other words, not asymmetric distribution of information but no (secure) information at all, even
with perfect ad hoc information on both sides, on future events is at the heart of the financial
business. In fact, we find the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty quite relevant in
this matter.7. Building Blocks for an Amended Theory
Table 4 summarizes the keystones for a complete new understanding of the
financial intermediation process and for a future direction of the theory of
financial intermediation. It compares these with the key concepts of current
financial intermediation theory. The building blocks of the amended theory
fundamentally differ from those of the existing theory. As has been said in the
beginning  of  this  essay,  there  is  a difference  in  paradigm;  a completely
different  perspective  that  is  taken  to  look  at  the  same  phenomenon.
Fortunately, it should be noted that in almost all of the new building blocks,
extensive research based on the concepts we indicate is well underway, as we
will conclude in the next section on the research agenda, but gaps are still
there. The research we refer to does hardly, or only very indirectly, point to
the essence of the intermediation process, deriving its dynamics from specific
basic views and problems (see Zingales, 2000).
The “oneliners” in Table 4 may be clarified in the following summary of our
argument. The static concept of a perfect, fully transparent market where
homogenous  products  are  traded  between  numerous  parties  who  have  no
individual  influence  on  equilibrium  prices  has  a limited  significance  as
a benchmark for the financial intermediation process. This is the case even
after, and paradoxically, to a considerable extent due to, the information and
communication revolution. The public financial markets – which are growing
in importance – seem to approach the characteristics of a perfect market but
they remain in a continuous process of development and change, both with
regard to the traded instruments and to the institutions that service the trading
on  the  public  markets.  This  process  is  conditioned  by  the  expertise  of
investment banks and the underwriting risk taking of banks, as well as by the
asset management expertise of banks, insurers and investment funds. Without
these intermediaries the public markets could not exist. Traditional corporate
banking is under pressure from this move towards public markets, but evolves
toward  specific  solutions  for  corporate  finance  (cash  flow  based  project
finance, leasing, etc.). Retail banking innovates by blending private savings,
insurance,  finance  and  investment  products  and  marketing  these  through
a diversity of distribution channels on a mass scale. Financial intermediaries
“de-homogenize” the markets by carving out niches for specific product-
market combinations and in specific geographical areas where their position
is  strong.  By  doing  so  they  differentiate  the  market  and  create  market
imperfections in so far as new products or databases for marketing contain
37unique,  captive  information.  This  process  of  building  up  market
imperfections in niche markets goes hand in hand with the leveling off of
market  imperfections  in  the  public  markets  trading.  It  is  the  process  of
creative destruction, as described by Schumpeter (1912).
Table 4: (Stylized) Contemporary and Amended Theory of Financial Intermediation
1
1 This table is – with adaptations – derived from Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000).
The justification for newly created market imperfections lies in the creation
of value for the customer in the new, specific products. Value creation for the
customer  is  the  rationale  of  intermediary  activity. Value  creation  justifies
transaction  costs  paid  to  the  intermediary.  The  value  that  a financial
intermediary  creates  results  from  the  qualitative  asset  transformation  it
performs.  The  core  of  this  qualitative  asset  transformation  is  risk
transformation. By transforming risk – either through the balance sheet or off-
balance through derivative obligations – the intermediary transforms assets
offered  by  savers  following  their  risk  preferences  into  assets  usable  by
entrepreneurial investors. Intermediary activity comes in where supply and
demand of capital cannot be (fully) met according to the risk preferences of
market parties in the public market. Adverse selection and credit rationing can
disturb  the  intermediation  process  when  information  flows  stagnate  or
become unreliable (corporate disclosure fraud) or when idiosyncratic shocks
(e.g.  affecting  sovereign  risk)  happen. These  generally  lead  to  temporary
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(Stylized) contemporary theory Amended theory
  Static: perfect market   Dynamic: market development; market
differentiation
  Market imperfections   Product innovation and market
development
  Financial intermediary is an agent    Financial intermediary is an 
between savers and investors, monitors  entrepreneurial provider of financial 
loans on behalf of depositors services
  Efficient allocation of savings   Qualitative asset transformation; risk 
transformation
  Transaction costs   Value creation
  Asymmetric information   Customer orientation, both to real 
investors and savers
  Adverse selection, moral hazard,    Risk management; risk/reward 
credit rationing, auditing optimization
  Regulation as market imperfection   Regulation for institutional and systemic 
risk control
  Disintermediation   Dynamics of intermediation (new 
markets, new products, new agents)market imperfections which have little to do with the normal intermediation
process.
The value creation process of banks evolves over time. Generally speaking it
moves from on-balance to off-balance activities, from risk absorption through
financing to risk management and absorption via capital market operations.
Moreover, the specific functions of individual banks in the value chain evolve
too. Vertical integration of these functions is not essential any more; delivery
and manufacturing of banking services can be separated via in- and out-
sourcing contracts. “Contract banking” structures (Llewellyn, 1999) provide
for adaptation to the dynamics of value creation in the financial services
industry.
Because asset transformation is a risky business and because money and
financial assets grease the economy, the financial intermediaries are placed
under the surveillance of regulators. This happens in the interest of savers
who deposit their money with intermediaries or build up contingency claims
with them, and in the interest of the financial system as a whole (systemic
risk). Moral hazard can be a by-product of regulation and creates a market
imperfection,  which  must  be  weighed  against  the  importance  of  certain
regulatory measures or interventions. However, moral hazard does not offset
the overriding importance of an adequate regulatory system as a supervisor
over the quality of risk management by intermediaries.
Presumably because the need for risk transformation is so large and still
increasing, intermediaries remain to find a solid place in the financial arena.
Their contribution to national income grows. This does not imply that every
type of financial intermediation faces a bright future. Traditional corporate
banking  is  in  decline;  traditional  equity  brokerage  too.  But  specialist
corporate  banking,  investment  banking,  retail  banking  and  life  insurance,
investment fund management and specialist corporate and investment risk
management are expanding, be it with more volatile results than before. There
certainly is a decline of some forms of intermediation, but there is no question
at all of disintermediation as a general process in the economy. Banking
remains  essential  to  a modern  society,  but  not  necessarily  executed  by
traditional banks.
Does  the  amended  theory  fully  contradict  the  present  one  and  have  the
concepts of the present theory become obsolete? The concepts of the present
theory of financial intermediation do remain adequate for the analysis of the
financial  intermediation,  both  at  the  macroeconomic  and  at  the
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intermediary  is  the  optimal  allocation  of  savings  and  investments  within
households and the economy as a whole, with institutional and behavioral
frictions  preventing  optimal  allocation.  Here,  the  concept  of  asymmetric
information  remains  very  useful.  The  functioning  of  the  international
financial system in general and problems of systemic risk are well analyzed
with  the  tools  of  contemporary  banking  theory  (adverse  selection,  credit
rationing,  moral  hazard;  see  Holmström  and Tirole,  2001).  Secondly,  the
microeconomic case studies of entrepreneurial and managerial behavior of
financial  intermediaries  have  got  a generally  recognized  record,  applying
game theory type of models using present theory concepts. The empirical
verification of these models remains, however, problematic; the evidence is
usually rather anecdotal. The contemporary theory of financial intermediation
is  not  well-equipped  to  explain  market  dynamism,  the  flow  of  product
innovations, the effects of technological advance, and above all, it does not
give  the  right,  pivotal,  role  to  risk  transformation  and  management.  An
amended  theory  is  necessary  to  explain  what  was,  is,  and  remains  the
essential function of banking and finance, how this function leads to new risk
products, both for the intermediaries’ own account (like “over the counter
derivatives”, fiscal driven leasing finance, different types of project finance)
and  new  risk  products  developed  by  them  for  the  open  market,  like
convertibles, warrants, asset backed securities, etc.
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Would the amended theory of financial intermediation lead to a new research
agenda? Partly. Battacharya and Thakor have listed what they regard as the
key questions and puzzles for financial intermediation research in 1993. Let
us start with this old agenda, what is still open on it, and add research items
which would benefit from our amended approach. As “unresolved issues”
Battacharya  and  Thakor  mention  first:  “What  is  the  role  of  financial
institutions  in  financial  innovation?”.  This  evidently  is  a subject  “par
excellence” for analysis with concepts like the ones mentioned above. “What
are  the  economic  bases  for  differences  among  financial  systems  across
countries and through time?” is their second issue. This is a wide area of
research since Gerschenkron (1962) and Goldsmith (1969), gaining topicality
in view of the developments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and with the
financial crises in Asia and Latin America in mind. The theory of financial
systems, however, so far appears to ignore the poorer areas in the world (the
work of Allen and Gale (2000b) is illustrative in this respect). It encompasses
empirical description, modeling and testing of different financial systems in
their  relation  to  macroeconomic  growth  patterns.  Is  the  financial  system
welfare  improving,  welfare  destroying  or  neutral?  The  evolution  of  the
financial  markets  and  financial  innovation,  next  to  optimal  allocation  of
savings,  should  become  analytical  concepts  of  central  importance.
Institutional  developments  (role  of  governments,  banking  supervision,
governance of market parties, problems of “crony capitalism”) are gaining
analytical attention as well in this research area (see Beck et al., 2000; Beck
and  Levine,  2000;  Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Maksimovic,  2000;  Pagano  and
Volpin, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2000).
“What are the issues in banking system design?” is the next topic listed by
Bhattacharya and Thakor. Here, the authors mean primarily the optimal size
of banks: are bank mergers beneficial to welfare? These issues, including
those of competition between banks and other financial institutions and the
question  of  whether  some  countries  are  overbanked,  need  an  industrial
economics and a product innovation/market development approach as well.
A rich stream of research has become available on these issues, especially in
the US, but recently for Europe as well (see Molyneux et al., 1997; Piloff and
Santomero, 1998; Berger et al., 1999; Altunbas et al., 2000; Berger et al.,
2000; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001). Up till now, the results show little proof
of  economies  of  scale  and  scope  in  the  United  States  but  some  scale
41efficiencies were concluded by Altunbas et al. (2000) in the wake of the
Europe 1992 program. In general, the optimal scale found in most studies is
much smaller than that of the modus of bank size in most modern economies.
The studies also reveal skepticism in the blessings of bank mergers. Others
(e.g. Boot and Schmeits, 1999) presume that scale and scope economies could
re-emerge  as  critical  issues  in  the  future  as  a consequence  of  technical
progress, especially in payment systems. The dynamics of technologically
driven product innovation will have to be introduced in the scale and scope
and X-inefficiency research. Piloff and Santomero (1998) make the value-
effects of bank mergers already an explicit subject of their research. The new
research on essential and less essential bank functions and the concept of
“contract banking” (Llewellyn, 1999. See also Claessens et al., 2000) are also
an example of the new dynamic value-chain approach.
“How should securities markets and non-bank financial intermediaries be
structured and regulated?” is the issue Bhattacharya and Thakor listed last.
“Regulation interferes in the intermediation process and it makes the financial
sector an even more imperfectly competing – in more than one respect –
industry, as regulation by its nature is based on imperfect information for all
other market participants” they say. Indeed, imperfect information is one of
the headaches of regulators and a source of inspiration to market parties who
like  to  create  novelties  falling  beyond  existing  regulation  or  to  arbitrage
around  rules  and  regulations.  Regulations  have  a clear  impact,  both
intentionally  and  unintentionally,  on  market  prices  and  on  the  innovative
behavior  of  intermediaries.  Too  static  models  fall  short  and  need  to  be
complemented  by  dynamic  approaches  encompassing  the  impact  of
regulation on product development. Regulatory dialectic (Kane, 1977) is an
example  of  the  dynamic  approach  towards  regulation.  The  regulation  of
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions is mostly the domain of
public  authorities.  Usually,  this  regulation  is  to  some  extent  made  up  in
discussion  with  market  parties.  Scientific  analysis,  based  on  asymmetric
information and risk containment concepts has strongly gained ground in the
meantime. (It is curious to note that Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) did not
list bank regulation on their list of unresolved issues!). Freedman (2000) goes
into the extent to which financial intermediation theory can act as a guidance
in designing an effective regulatory framework.
Since  Bhattacharya  and  Thakor  drew  up  their  research  agenda  for
contemporary  banking  theory  in  1993,  risk  management  and  risk
transformation  in  the  intermediation  process  have  become  a common
denominator  in  the  research  on  financial  intermediaries  and  financial
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process  has  since  then  become  a common  denominator  in  the  research
agenda. Risk analysis is, since the emergence of the capital asset pricing
models and asset pricing theory, fully incorporated at the firm level in pricing
models and plays the central role in research of securities and derivatives.
Value-at-risk is also becoming the central theme in bank regulation (see the
Basel II framework on monitoring financial risks and risk management with
banks and on providing incentives for adequate amounts of capital). And risk
management  has  gained  attention  at  both  the  firm-level  and  the  macro-
economy  (Hunter  and  Smith,  2002).  Other  questions  are:  What  is  the
remuneration to the financial industry for its risk transforming activity? Is this
remuneration adequate in view of losses incurred by bad debts, exchange risk,
interest rate and stock price movements? What is the RAROC of the banking
industry as a whole? Is the risk absorbing function of the financial industry
increasing because of a growing volatility of risk causing economic factors
(interest  rates,  exchange  rates)? And  how  is  this  volatility  related  to  the
income of the industry? Does the increasing contribution of the financial
industry  to  GNP reflect  the  compensation  for  increasing  risks?  Is  the
increasing risk absorption by financial intermediaries reflected in the level
and volatility of the stock prices of these institutions? What margins should
they earn to remain in a position to raise stock in the future? On the level of
the  banking  firm  the  new  approaches  to  value-at-risk  and  credit  risk
management have already opened a vast domain for further research (e.g.
Caouette et al., 1998; Saunders, 1999, Bessis, 2002).
All these questions and others which emerge from the dynamics of financial
intermediation  appear  to  be  relevant  nowadays  and  may  invite  curious
researchers to take brave new steps in the unknown. We would welcome such
steps and invite these researchers to innovate the current theories of financial
intermediation  into  ones  that  are  able  to  understand  and  to  explain  the
function  and  behavior  of  real-life  financial  intermediaries  in  our  modern
society.
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1. In the course of economic development a country’s financial superstructure
grows more rapidly than the infrastructure of national product and national
wealth. Hence the financial interrelations ratio (the quotient of the aggregate
market value of all financial instruments in existence in a country at a given
date to the value of its tangible net national wealth) has a tendency to increase.
2. This  increase  in  a country’s financial  interrelations  ratio,  however,  is  not
a process that continues without limit.
3. Economically  less  developed  countries  have  much  lower  financial
interrelations ratios than those which prevail in Europe or North-America.
4. The main determinant of the relative size of a country’s financial superstructure
is  the  separation  of  the  functions  of  saving  and  investing  among  different
economic units and groups of them.
5. In most countries the share of financial institutions in the issuance and the
ownership  of  financial  assets  has  considerably  increased  in  the  process  of
economic development.
6. This “institutionalization” of saving and of the ownership of financial assets
has affected the main types of financial instruments differently.
7. Financial development in the modern sense has started everywhere with the
banking system and has been dependent on the diffusion of scriptural money
through the economy.
8. As economic development has progressed, the share of the banking system in
the assets of all financial institutions has declined, though its share in the
country’s total financial assets has continued to increase for a while.
9. Foreign  financing,  as  either  a source  of  funds  supplementing  those
domestically available or as an outlet for funds not easily utilizable within the
country, has played a substantial role in some phase of the development of most
countries.
10. Probably as important for the financial development of most countries as these
flows of funds across international boundaries was the example provided by the
more advanced countries. Transfer of technology and entrepreneurship have
been easier to accomplish, and on the whole more successful, with respect to
financial instruments and financial institutions than in many other fields.
11. The cost of financing, including interest rates and other charges, is distinctly
lower  in  financially  developed  than  in  less  developed  countries,  with
occasional exceptions mainly reflecting the effects of inflation.
12. As  real  income  and  wealth  increase,  in  the  aggregate  and  per  head  per
population, the size and complexity of the financial superstructure grow.SUERF -
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